Gran nota de Mike Rappaport, parte 1.
La aplicación de la Cuarta Enmienda de Estados Unidos a nuevos supuestos de avances tecnológicos demuestra que la invitación dirigida a los jueces para que decidan los casos conforme a circunstancias venideras que no surgen del sentido público y común de las palabras de la norma al momento de su sanción y ratificación -o en su defecto de su entendimiento por el legislador, el constituyente o el público en general- sólo puede ser una invitación, valga la redundancia, de tinte normativa, incluso con carácter de common law.
"As Justice Thomas’s dissent in Carpenter indicated, the original meaning of search seems to be the ordinary meaning at the time of 'looking over or through' or 'examining by inspection.' And the original meaning only covers searches of 'persons, houses, papers, and effects.' But a key provision of the text is that it prohibits “unreasonable searches.” What does that mean? Many people have assumed that this language left the concept of reasonableness unclear and therefore amounts to a delegation to future judges.
But while the text—in the abstract—might seem like it could have that meaning, Laura Donahue has persuasively argued that an “unreasonable search” is a search that conflicts with the “reason of the common law.” In other words, searches that violate the common law rules for searches at the time of the Fourth Amendment are unreasonable searches. Thus, the Fourth Amendment incorporated the common law rules at the time and it did so with the language of 'unreasonable searches'".
